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Abstract
Over the past decade, most Latin American countries have moved toward either extreme of floating
rates or dollarization, in line with worldwide trends.  In this paper, we evaluate the wisdom of those
decisions and the choice of monetary regime more generally. We first evaluate the desirability of
adopting a common currency in the region. We find that, under present circumstances, the costs of a
common currency are likely to outweigh its benefits, as these countries do not trade much with each
other and, moreover, they face diverse economic shocks, their business cycles are not coordinated,
and they are affected by common shocks to sentiment in international financial markets only to the
same extent than the average pair of emerging markets. We next consider the unilateral dollarization
option. For most Latin American countries, this would be desirable only when there are strong links
to the US economy, the credibility of the monetary authorities is irreversibly lost, and there is a
keen demand for dollar-denominated financial assets. Finally, we review the relatively short
experience of floating exchange regimes in Latin America and find that, despite the external
constraints, floating countries have retained sufficient flexibility to use monetary policy for
domestic ends in response to important shocks.
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Over the past decade, many middle-income developing countries have moved away from 
intermediate exchange rate regimes and toward either extreme of floating rates or hard pegs 
such as currency boards or dollarization. In the 1980s and early 1990s, intermediate regimes 
such as soft pegs, crawling pegs, and crawling bands were the norm. Now, these options are 
increasing falling out of favor, particularly for those emerging market countries that are 
highly integrated in international financial markets.    
 
In this paper, we analyze the choice of exchange rate regime in Latin America. We start, in 
Section II, by taking stock of the evolution of exchange regimes in the region and exploring 
the reasons for that evolution. While the general trend in Latin America is not very different 
from that in other regions, it would appear that Latin American countries tend to move in 
large clusters from regime to regime. We note that empirical equations that try to explain 
regime choices do not fare particularly well for Latin American countries. In particular, the 
popularity of intermediate regimes seemed excessive ten years ago, but this has been 
neutralized with the generalized move to floating in the recent years 
 
In Section III, we ask whether Latin American countries should form an independent 
common currency area. We apply a modern version of the theory of optimal currency areas 
(OCA). This approach is well suited to choosing between the two extremes of exchange rate 
regimes, because it focuses on the choice between a common currency and individually 
floating exchange rates. In this framework, a common currency is advantageous to the extent 
that it reduces transaction costs and thus encourages trade. It is costly insofar as it does not 
allow each country to conduct an independent monetary and exchange rate policy so as to 
buffer external shocks and respond to domestic conditions that may be dissimilar. We find 
that, under present circumstances, the costs of a common currency are likely to outweigh the 
benefits for the countries of Latin America. In fact, these countries do not trade much with 
each other, as has been noted elsewhere. Perhaps more surprisingly, they face diverse 
economic shocks and their business cycles are not coordinated. Finally, they are affected by 
common shocks to sentiment in international financial markets, but no more so than is the 
average pair of emerging markets.  
 
In Section IV, we consider a different form of non-national monetary arrangement, namely 
unilateral dollarization. As with the choice to form a common currency, whether this option 
is a good one for a particular country depends on whether it is sufficiently similar and 
integrated with the United States, so that the monetary policy of the U.S. is acceptable. 
However, potential financial fragility and lack of credibility seem to be even more relevant 
considerations. With poor credibility of the monetary authorities and strong demand for 
dollar-denominated financial assets (“spontaneous” or “de facto” dollarization), it becomes 
extremely costly to run a national monetary regime. Countries are forced to live with high 
interest rates, highly volatile exchange rates and prices, and a high degree of vulnerability in 
the financial sector. Unilateral dollarization is perceived as an effective and immediate way 
of importing monetary credibility, even if it implies giving up the national central bank, 
thereby forgoing seigniorage and lender-of-last-resort facilities.  
 
Finally, in Section V we review some of the evidence on whether emerging market floaters 
do in fact benefit from their monetary policy autonomy. We ask whether a credibility gap 
prevents emerging market countries from being “free floaters” by forcing them to intervene 
in foreign exchange markets and to adjust interest rates in an attempt to moderate exchange 
rates fluctuations. But the key question is whether emerging market floaters get something 
valuable for eschewing the credibility and lower transaction costs of dollarization, that is, 
whether they retain sufficient flexibility to use monetary policy for domestic ends in response 
to important shocks. Specifically, we examine the response of monetary policy to domestic 
inflation, output gaps, and shocks to terms of trade and worldwide interest rates.  
 
We conclude that some countries are indeed viable candidates for pursuing a floating 
exchange rate, while others are good candidates for dollarization. Life will be difficult for 
countries that are neither. 
 
 
II. Evolution of Exchange Rate Arrangements in Latin America. Choices and Reasons 
 
By 2001, a majority of Latin American countries had either adopted the US dollar as legal 
tender currency or instituted a floating exchange rate regime—the latter often combined with 
an inflation target (Table 1).
2 Chile staged a gradual and orderly exit from an intermediate 
exchange rate system to a float. Other changes in exchange rate regime took place under 
crisis or near-crisis circumstances. Notably, Brazil and Mexico moved to floats under heavy 
losses of foreign exchange reserves, but have subsequently operated their new exchange rate 
regimes without excessive strain. Ecuador and El Salvador dollarized fully. In 2002, 
Argentina moved to a float under an intense financial crisis, after having maintained a 
currency board for eleven years. Also in 2002 Venezuela moved to a float from an 
intermediate regime under milder external pressure conditions. And so on.  
 
In the rest of the world, there has also been a move to the “corners” (Figure 1). In Asia, 
Thailand moved from a de facto peg to an independent float, and Korea and Indonesia from a 
managed float to an independent float. The Philippines maintained a floating regime, while 
Malaysia, an outlier, has maintained a traditional fixed exchange rate since 1998. In contrast 
to Latin America, there have been no moves toward currency boards or currency unions. 
                                                   
2 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have emphasized the difference between de jure regimes and de 
facto regimes, that is, between what the authorities do and what they say they do with respect 
to exchange rate policy. In the above, we have used the IMF’s official classification, which—
while beginning from the countries’ self-reported regime—now corrects it on the basis of the 
IMF staff’s views in those cases where the de facto regime clearly differs from the self-
reported regime. We also checked that the alternative classification produced by Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (1999) entirely on the basis of “deeds rather than words” is similar to the 
IMF’s official classification, at least for the countries in Latin America.  
 
 
The move to the corners has been primarily driven by heightened integration in international 
financial markets and the volatility of capital flows, which have led to the conclusion that 
intermediate regimes are more vulnerable to costly currency crises than are the “corner” 
regimes. A currency board gives stronger (if not foolproof) credibility and durability to a peg, 
and under full dollarization, without an exchange rate there is no risk of sharp devaluations. 
At the other end, a floating rate may permit to absorb international financial shocks more 
gradually and less stressfully. Latin American countries are indeed fairly open to 
international capital movements. Table 2 shows that an index that measures directly the 
incidence of capital controls yields generally low levels of restrictions for countries in the 
region, while de facto international financial integration (proxied by gross financial inflows 
plus outflows, in absolute value, as a ratio to GDP) has increased significantly for most Latin 
American countries in the past decade. 
 
The increasing popularity of floating exchange rate regimes is also related to the generalized 
decline in inflation. Previously, inflation stabilization objectives seemed to rule out the 
possibility of floating exchange rates, and to require pegs or quasi-pegs, at least temporarily. 
Indeed, the exchange rate was a central instrument in many inflation stabilization plans, and 
fixing the rate (often through currency boards) proved to be particularly effective in stopping 
hyperinflations. For countries wishing to preserve some exchange rate flexibility, 
intermediate regimes were intended to keep a lid on devaluation and inflation expectations 
through bands and pegs, and to prevent gradual losses of competitiveness by letting the rate 




III. A Common Currency for Latin America? 
 
In this section we review the considerations relating to a common currency for Latin America 
or groups of Latin American countries. We analyze both the case in which Latin American 
countries lock their bilateral rates but float jointly as an independent currency, and the case in 
which they simultaneously adopt the U.S. dollar. A traditional approach, going back at least 
to Mundell (1961), is to ask whether the common currency candidates are subject to 
coordinated business cycles so that monetary policy would need to react in the same way in 
each country. As much has been written on this approach, we provide a highly selective 
review. We extend this idea by examining if changes in external financial conditions are also 
correlated among the group of Latin American countries. To the extent that they are, one 
could posit that their exchange rate policies should also be similar, strengthening the case for 
a common currency. 
 
Real-based optimal currency area (OCA) considerations 
 
Patterns of trade 
  
As is well known, at present Latin American countries are less open to international trade 
than are other countries at a similar level of economic development. Moreover, their 
direction of trade is highly diversified, with no dominant trading partner (Table 3).
3 In 
particular, the share of trade with the United States is often no larger than that with Europe or 
Japan for South American countries, and is only slightly larger for the typical Central 
American country. Mexico, with an 80 percent trade share with the United States, is an 
outlier. On this basis, Latin American countries do not seem to be especially suitable 
candidates for a common currency, nor is there a particularly strong case for them to 
dollarize. However, patterns of trade are to some extent endogenous, and the direction of 
trade could change substantially if a free trade zone in the Americas were to materialize.  
 
 
Comovement of economic variables 
 
The comovement of output fluctuations among the various countries in the world has been 
extensively analyzed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). Correlations of economic growth 
across pairs of countries are typically lower in Latin America than they are in Western 
Europe, and somewhat higher than in East Asia. Interestingly, for each Latin American 
country, correlations with U.S. growth are positive and often significant. However, this is 
also the case for East Asian countries, and even more so for Western European countries. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) also consider correlations of supply shocks as distinct from 
demand shocks, following the Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology. To assess the 
desirability and feasibility of a common currency, supply shocks are clearly more relevant, as 
one might expect demand shocks—which to a large extent may be policy-driven—to become 
more correlated under a common currency.  The correlation of supply shocks among the 
various Latin American countries is typically low and insignificant, and clearly lower than it 
is for the countries in the European Monetary Union. Moreover, the correlation of supply 
shocks with the United States is insignificant (and often negative) for all Latin American 
countries. On average, such shocks are larger in Latin America than in Western Europe or 
East Asia, and Latin America adjusts to them faster than Western Europe does, though more 
slowly than East Asia does. On the whole, these considerations do not support the case for a 
common currency in Latin America, or for widespread dollarization.  
 
Financial-based OCA considerations 
 
While the comovement of fundamental macroeconomic variables among Latin American 
countries does not seem to be particularly high, there is a widespread view that financial 
markets tend to treat Latin American countries as one bloc. At present, there is no clear 
theory of how financial variable comovement relates to optimum currency areas.  
Nevertheless, if there were evidence that Latin American countries are routinely hit by large, 
common financial shocks (such as a sudden loss of appetite for Latin American financial 
                                                   
3 Mussa et al. (2000) and Jadresic et al. (2001) report these facts for a large number of 
countries and potential common currency areas.  
 
assets, regardless of fundamentals), one might speculate that monetary and exchange rate 
policies should react in a similar way in each Latin American country. In that case, a 
common currency (whether an independent currency or the U.S. dollar) might be a 
reasonable way to go.  
 
Therefore, it seems helpful to complement the information obtained from comovement of 
real variables with that on comovement of financial variables, even if this is highly tentative 
because only financial asset prices, rather than shocks, can be observed. Our overall finding 
is that the degree of comovement of financial variables is not higher among Latin American 
countries than among emerging markets more generally. In other words, market participants 
may view emerging markets as one bloc, but they do not seem to view Latin American 
markets as a distinct group from the rest.
4  
 
Yields on government bonds issued by emerging markets in U.S. dollars are obvious 
candidates to consider. Specifically, we analyze the most closely-watched indicator by 
market participants, the EMBI+ spreads (vis-à-vis U.S. government bonds) computed by 
J.P.Morgan. On this basis, there seems to be very large comovement among the various Latin 
American emerging markets. However, the comovement among Latin American countries is 
not much higher than among other groups of countries. To abstract from the common 
component for all emerging market spreads, we first regress each individual country’s spread 
series on the overall EMBI+ spread series, and save the residuals. We then report the 
correlation matrix among these country-specific components of the spread series (Table 4). 
We conduct this exercise for the full sample for which the EMBI+ data are available (1998-
2001) and for a subsample that begins after the Russian crisis and that ends well before 
Argentinean spreads start to rise (1999-2000). For either sample period, the correlations 
between any two Latin American countries do not seem to be higher than the correlations 
between any two emerging markets.  
 
In the same vein, we examined directly the observed comovement of exchange rates among 
the various Latin American countries. Of course, this is largely obfuscated by the presence of 
exchange rate pegs. To mitigate this problem, we turn to the comovement of forward 
exchange rates, using non-deliverable forwards to the extent that the data are available (Table 
5). We again find that comovement is not particularly high among Latin American countries.  
 
An alternative way of summarizing the comovement of both exchange rate expectations and 
international financial market conditions is to consider results from an “early warning 
system” model designed to predict exchange rate crises. The model defines a currency crisis 
as an extreme change in an indicator of exchange market pressure, which is calculated as a 
weighted average of changes in the exchange rate and international reserves. We compute a 
correlation matrix of the estimated probabilities of crisis obtained from the “DCSD” model 
                                                   
4 This is somewhat in contrast with the studies on regional contagion, such as Glick and Rose 
(1999).   
 
developed at the IMF (Berg and Pattillo, 1999; Berg, Borensztein, Milesi-Ferretti, and 
Pattillo, 2000). A disadvantage of this approach is that it is designed to capture extreme 
events only; an advantage, however, is that it considers several macroeconomic and external 
variables with weights that reflect their relative ability to predict exchange rate movements. 
Although the model is based on fundamental variables, these would indirectly reflect changes 
in market sentiment as well. Using this approach, we find one more time that Latin American 
countries do not display greater comovement of probabilities than do other groups of 
countries (Table 6).  
 
 
Political and Institutional Considerations 
 
The European experience highlights the need for political commitment to a common 
currency and the time it may take to develop common institutions buttressing that 
commitment.
5 Moreover, EMU countries have very similar levels of economic and financial 
development. Per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted, 2000 data) is in a relatively tight range, 
between 16,000 U.S. dollars a year in Greece and 27,400 U.S. dollars in Belgium. This has 
made it easier to set up a currency union without engendering pressures for massive fiscal 
transfers or migration on a scale that might prove socially unsustainable.
6 By contrast, in 
Latin America, GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted, 2000 data) ranges from 2,200 U.S. dollars a 
year in Honduras to 11,000 U.S. dollars in Argentina. Even within Mercosur, GDP per capita 
is 4,000 U.S. dollars in Paraguay and 6,800 U.S. dollars in Brazil, still well below that of 
Uruguay (10,000 U.S. dollars) or Argentina.  This suggests that a move toward the creation 
of a common currency would be a complicated and slow process for the Latin American 
countries.  
 
One advantage of a common currency compared with individual currencies is it might make 
it easier to attain political consensus for central bank independence, and may even serve as a 
catalyst for other desirable policies, including fiscal discipline. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a 
common currency without durable guarantees of central bank independence. In the European 
case, independence of the individual countries' central banks was a precondition for EMU 
membership, and the European Central Bank itself has strong institutional guarantees of 
independence. Similarly, many policy-makers have been attracted by the discipline imposed 
by the Maastricht preconditions in the areas of monetary and fiscal policy. In principle, both 
                                                   
5 Bayoumi et al. (2000) provide a recent application of economic and political considerations 
to the desirability and feasibility of a common currency for the countries in South-East Asia. 
Similar considerations apply to Latin America. 
6 Net transfers within the EU have been fairly limited as viewed from the richer countries—
which are also relatively large—although they amount to a few percentage points of GDP for 
some of the recipient countries, such as Greece and Portugal, which are relatively small.   
 
central bank independence and monetary and fiscal discipline can be obtained by individual 
countries, but a common currency may serve as a useful political catalyst.  
 
On the whole, under current conditions, an independent common currency for Latin America 
does not seem to be especially appealing. As always, however, it is important to bear in mind 
that conditions that determine the desirability of a common currency are to a certain extent 
endogenous. As mentioned above, initiatives to increase trade integration among Latin 
American countries would increase the appeal of a common currency, in addition to fostering 
economic growth in the region.  
 
At any rate, an independent common currency in Latin American is not likely to emerge, at 
least not in the next decade. The alternative choice for abandoning the national currency 
would be “unilateral dollarization.” Unilateral dollarization does not require a long process of 
building common institutions and reaching consensus, which took decades in Europe. 
Moreover, with unilateral dollarization, fiscal transfers to mitigate country-specific shocks 
are just not an option, and the dollarizing country ends up with no say in setting monetary 
policy. Thus, while the move toward a common currency engendered widespread resistance 
among some sections of the public in several European countries, Ecuador and El Salvador 
were able to dollarize speedily and with no political resistance on the part of the United 
States’ public or authorities. 
 
 
IV. Unilateral Dollarization 
 
We have seen that there is no obvious case to be made for dollarization on the basis of 
optimum currency area considerations. Nevertheless, dollarization may be appealing to those 
countries lacking credibility and where de facto dollarization has already reached high levels. 
Some Latin American countries have already taken the decision to unilaterally adopt the US 
dollar as the legal tender currency. The classic case is Panama, which has used the US dollar 
since its creation in 1904. More recently, Ecuador adopted the dollar in 1999 in the midst of a 
financial and currency crisis, and El Salvador started to make the transition to full 
dollarization in a gradual way at end-2000 under more tranquil conditions. The dollarization 
option has also been considered by other Central American nations, who seem to be watching 
developments in El Salvador intently, and was intensely debated in Argentina until recently. 
In this section, we review the main pros and cons of dollarization for the various types of 
economies in Latin America. 
 
Monetary Credibility  
 
For many countries, the main gain that could be obtained from dollarization is to neutralize 
the domestic monetary institutions’ poor credibility, which may have been caused by past 
violations of exchange rate pegs or bands, a history of soft financing of the fiscal deficit or 
the banking system, and high inflation. Such poor credibility and the related expectations of 
devaluation and/or inflation bring about chronically high ex-post interest rates when 
monetary discipline is maintained, and a high demand for foreign financial assets, implying  
 
capital flight or dollarization of domestic financial assets. In cases of extremely poor 
credibility, it may seem impossible to implement an independent monetary arrangement. 
Pegs or intermediate regimes involving some form of exchange rate commitment result in 
high interest rates with serious consequences for fiscal sustainability and private investment; 
a floating regime leads to high volatility of the exchange rate and episodes of overshooting, 
unless the central bank engages in an active defense of the exchange rate, thus undermining 
the principles of the floating currency regime itself. 
 
Latin American countries have made progress in establishing credibility by making their 
central banks more independent and improving monetary discipline over the past decades. 
Many Latin American countries enacted new central bank laws in the 1990s that conferred 
relatively high levels of independence and accountability to the central banks. A number of 
Latin American countries—especially those that enacted new central bank reforms in the 
mid- and late 1990s—now score quite high on indices quantifying the degree of legal 
independence and accountability of central banks (Table 7). These indices are imperfect, 
because sometimes central banks operate de facto much more (or less) independently than 
their charters suggest. Nevertheless, the indices seems to correlate well with inflation over 
the last few years in this limited sample of countries.  
 
However, it may take years to establish credibility. In fact, interest rates remain high despite 
the sharp decline in actual inflation during the last decade. In classic illustration of the “peso 
problem,” nominal interest rates are still high, owing to expectations of inflation (or 
devaluation). Ex-post real interest rates are above 10 percent (per year) on bank deposits in 
several South American countries while the surge in prices does not take place. The lack of 
credibility increases finance costs also for the private sector, with negative effects on 
investment and growth. In addition, poor monetary credibility may increase the volatility of 
expected inflation, which in turn may increase the risk premium attached to domestic-
currency debt (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 1998). This second effect is probably less important.   
 
Sovereign default risk also contributes to increasing finance costs for the private sector. This 
is because rating agencies have traditionally applied a “sovereign ceiling” in their foreign 
currency ratings, implying that no private borrower could be rated higher than the national 
government. The logic is that, in a debt crisis situation, the government would apply capital 
controls and use the scarce foreign reserves to service their debts first. Standard and Poor’s 
(1997) concluded that it was not necessary to apply the sovereign ceiling in fully dollarized 
economies, such as Panama. Interestingly, it reached the same conclusion for countries, such 
as Argentina, where the US dollar was widely used in parallel with the domestic currency, 
even if one could conceive of situations where controls could be imposed to protect the 
banking sector in those cases as well.  
 
There do not appear to be easy fixes to avoid higher private finance costs resulting from poor 
monetary credibility. Indexation of financial contracts to the inflation rate would seem to be 
helpful and has been used extensively in Chile, and to some extent in Brazil. However, policy 
makers in other countries have stayed away from financial indexation, fearing that its very 
existence would lead to its application to other types of nominal arrangements, such as  
 
wages. More importantly perhaps, if the relevant alternative assets for investors are foreign-
currency denominated securities, indexation would not completely eliminate the need for 
high domestic interest rates to compensate for devaluation risk.  
 
Thus, even in cases when an independent monetary regime is workable, credibility problems 
may still cause high financial costs for the government and the private sector, affecting 




Another manifestation of the lack of monetary credibility is that citizens want to hold U.S. 
dollars, not domestic currency. One form of this is capital flight; another is spontaneous, or 
“de facto” dollarization, that is, the holding of a large fraction of domestic monetary assets 
(bank deposits and cash) in foreign currency. Capital flight is difficult to conceptualize, let 
alone estimate. A suggestive, if incomplete, indicator is the volume of deposits held by the 
non-bank private sector abroad with banks that are part of the BIS reporting system (Figure 
2). These cross-border deposits rose steadily in the 1980s, but the trend reversed for many 
countries approximately at the time when they reduced their debts through Brady deals.
7 
After the Mexican crisis, however, the increase in deposits held abroad resumed. At present,  
the volume of deposits abroad is substantial for most Latin American countries, typically 
ranging between 5 and 15 percent of GDP. 
 
Foreign-currency denominated deposits are very large in many Latin American countries, 
particularly Bolivia, Peru, and—before their recent “pesification”—Argentina (Table 8). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests cash holdings of U.S. dollars are widespread in several Latin 
American countries. While investors may hold foreign-currency denominated assets for 
“normal” portfolio diversification reasons, it is overwhelmingly plausible that the main 
motivation in Latin America is the lack of monetary credibility. Indeed, this is in contrast to 
the “home bias” observed in advanced economies.  
 
Moreover, corporations also show a preference to borrow in foreign currency. The reasons 
for this may be manifold, including insufficient development of domestic financial markets, 
and companies trying to take advantage of implicit official guarantees. Jeanne (2002) raises 
the possibility that, when the risk premium attached to domestic debt is very high, companies 
may be forced to take foreign-currency denominated debt because they would risk 
bankruptcy if they held high interest, domestic currency debt.  
 
One important implication of a high degree of spontaneous dollarization is that large changes 
in the exchange rate can bring about a financial sector crisis and large-scale corporate 
bankruptcies. Even if commercial banks were well matched in terms of the currency 
                                                   
7 A possible explanation of this turning point is that the deposits abroad were needed as 
collateral for international trade finance during the debt crisis years.  
 
denomination of their assets and liabilities, a large devaluation would shift many dollar loans 
into nonperforming status. It has been argued that, absent an exchange rate peg and implicit 
or explicit government guarantees, and helped by appropriate prudential regulations, banks 
and corporations would hedge their foreign exchange positions (Goldstein, 2001). However, 
it is not clear that the exchange rate risk could be hedged for the country as a whole. In the 
aggregate, it would be necessary for foreigners with “deep pockets” to provide exchange rate 
insurance and bear all the risk. For reasons that perhaps are not well understood, foreign 
investors seem to be resistant to doing so, implying that emerging market countries by and 
large cannot borrow internationally in their own currency. Presumably, the difficulties are 
worse for small countries, with high information costs for international investors.  
 
If hedging the foreign exchange risk with international markets is not possible, the central 
bank will be forced to limit fluctuations in the exchange rate. Although countries rarely 
pursue “pure” floats (nor should they), there are occasions when large changes in the 
exchange rate would be justified. With the risk of heavy losses in the banking sector, 
however, the central bank will have to be extremely cautious about allowing large exchange 
rate adjustments.  
 
In conclusion, the appeal of complete dollarization is greater for countries already displaying  
high (and not reversible) spontaneous dollarization. Under such circumstances, any floating 
exchange rate regime would fail to provide much real flexibility; the seigniorage loss of 
giving up the domestic currency is smaller, and uncertainties in the financial sector may be 
reduced.  
 
Advantages of Integration 
 
A key advantage that dollarization may bring about is to encourage greater economic 
integration with the United States. As far as trade is concerned, there is some evidence that 
the use of a common currency is a factor that encourages bilateral trade among the countries 
that share a currency. For example, Engels and Rogers (19--) found evidence that Canadian 
provinces tend to be more integrated in trade volume and price level differences among 
themselves than with U. S. states that are closer geographically, trading on the order of 20 
times more among themselves than with nearby U. S. states. There may be many factors 
explaining this, and the use of a common currency is probably one of them. More significant 
are the findings by Rose, in a series of papers, that on the basis of a large panel of countries 
finds that a common currency may increase bilateral trade flows between countries by as 
much as four times. These estimates look extremely high, and indeed their robustness has 
been challenged. Klein (2002) found that, while there is a large bilateral trade effect in 
Rose’s equations in flows between developing countries, there is no significant effect on the 
bilateral trade between the United States and developing countries that use the dollar as 
currency.
 8  
                                                   
8 See Tenreyro (2001) and Persson (2001), who argue that endogenizing the choice to belong 
to a currency area reduces the significance of the results.  
 
Regardless of the actual size of the effect, one can expect dollarization to increase economic 
relations with the United States, including foreign direct investment, which has beneficial 
effects. Also, it could bring about a closer integration in financial markets.  One of the most 
profound effects of Panama's dollarization is the close integration of its banking system with 
that of the United States and indeed with the rest of the world, particularly since a major 
liberalization in 1969-1970.  
 
It could also be argued that dollarization could foster better financial discipline in 
government as it would not be possible to use the inflation tax anymore. That is, it would not 
be possible to finance fiscal deficits or to support the domestic financial sector simply by 
printing money. This is, however, a more doubtful argument. The higher degree of credibility 
afforded by dollarization could be used to finance more expansionary fiscal policies and 
more risk-taking in the financial sector. While the cost of a crisis would be higher, the 
probability of falling into a crisis would be perceived to be smaller, and this could encourage 
governments to take higher risks. 
 
How Does It All Add Up 
 
The ideal candidate for dollarization would be a small economy (not likely to benefit from a 
floating exchange rate to begin with), with close trade and economic links with the United 
States (to benefit from their potential strengthening by the use of a common currency), with a 
high degree of spontaneous dollarization (implications for the banking sector and less 
seigniorage), and poor credibility for the monetary authority. Not many countries fit the bill. 
Mexico and countries in Central America tend to be much more integrated with the United 
States but have less credibility issues and usually less spontaneous dollarization. For these 
countries the key will be to find out how big the benefits of dollarization may be in terms of 
higher integration with the United States, when firm conclusions can be drawn from the cases 
of Ecuador and El Salvador. Many countries in South America have serious credibility 
problems but are economies that may benefit from exchange rate flexibility.  In this case, the 
test will be whether floating regimes with inflation targeting can build up the requisite 
credibility to run an independent monetary regime without creating an undue burden on the 
domestic economy.  
 
 
V. Floating Exchange Rates 
 
Is a floating exchange rate regime a viable option for the countries of Latin America? A 
floating exchange rate, in the sense we use it, is one in which the nominal exchange rate 
moves frequently and substantially in response (in part) to market forces, with the authorities 
not setting a particular level or rate of change. This does not preclude substantial intervention 
active monetary policies with an eye to the exchange rate, as we discuss below. Our reading 
of the evidence is that, while there is much truth to the “fear of floating” claim that emerging  
 
markets do not float like the U.S. or Japan, they also do in fact typically float to some extent, 
in that their exchange rates do indeed move around substantially.
 9 
 
The more interesting and important question is whether the flexibility in exchange rate and 
monetary policy achieves meaningful domestic objectives. The rest of the section focuses on 
this question. We first set the stage by briefly reviewing the experience of a few interesting 
emerging markets over the latter half the of the 1990s. We then look at the available 
systematic evidence. We begin by reviewing the literature on how a floating exchange rate 
should respond to various shocks, noting how various conditions specific to emerging 
markets, in particular lack of credibility and financial fragility, might modify this optimal 
response. We then examine available evidence on whether emerging market exchange rates 
and monetary policy appear to be useful tools of countercyclical and anti-inflationary policy.  
 
Even if monetary policy flexibility has some value, costs may be too high. Two are most 
likely to be important. First, the lack of credibility associated with a floating exchange rate 
may imply higher real interest rates, perhaps due to a “peso problem” of a looming if never 
realized collapse. Finally, it may also be that unstable expectations or unruly markets 
generate excessive exchange rate volatility in emerging market floats. We briefly look at 




We consider the experience of Mexico, Chile, Peru and Singapore as (at least nominally) 
floating exchange rate countries, and Hong Kong and Argentina as hard pegs in the latter half 
of the 1990s. We are particularly interested in the comparison of Mexico, Chile and Peru 
with Argentina as well as Singapore with Hong Kong during the turmoil period of the late 
1990s.  
 
First, consider Argentina in Figure 3a. The top panel shows the inflation rate, the real 
effective exchange rate, and real GDP growth (year over year) for 1996 through 2001. The 
bottom panel shows the level of the nominal and real interest rate and the change (year over 
year) in the real effective exchange rate. We can see the unsurprising stability of the price 
level and hence the real exchange rate, as well as the still strong credibility of the currency 
board keeping interest rates flat through the turmoil of the Russia, LTCM and Brazil crises of 
1998/1999. The only variable that is affected is real GDP growth, which dives and of course 
still has not recovered.  
 
Figure 3d presents the same information for Mexico. The response in 1998/1999 is strikingly 
different. While interest rates did spike up, the exchange rate was also allowed to weaken 
                                                   
9 Roubini (2001), Edwards and Savastano (1999) and Eichengreen (2002) provide useful 
discussions of general exchange rate issues for emerging markets; the latter concentrates on 
the same issues of concern to us in this section.  
substantially. Real GDP growth dipped but resumed in 1999, and the exchange rate 
appreciated rapidly back up.
10  Two other points emerge from the figures. First, real rates 
have been quite low since the turmoil of 1998/1999, for example dipping below 5 percent in 
2001 when Mexico followed the recession in the United States. Second, inflation in Mexico 
has come down well below 10 percent. This suggest that Mexico’s monetary policy has been 
flexible enough to allow interest rates to respond to cyclical downturns, taking advantage of 
the prevalence of lower inflation. 
 
Peru (Figure 3e) confirms some aspects of this story. Even this highly dollarized economy 
responded to the shocks of 1998/1999 through a combination of higher interest rates and a 
substantial, and in this case prolonged, depreciation in the real exchange rate. The outcome 
for growth was, however, not as cheerful as in Mexico, presumably in part because of the 
weaker impulse from the strong U.S. economy. The Figure also suggests another reason, that, 
in contrast to Mexico, the authorities seem to have first attempted to raise interest rates 
without letting the exchange rate go, only subsequently allowing the weakening. In the event, 
it is worth noting that there is no sign that inflation in fact picked up much at all following 
the depreciation. 
 
Chile’s story (Figure 3b) is similar story to that of Peru, though the response of interest rates 
seems higher relative to exchange rates, and the recession is sharper. Chile went through two 
episodes of exchange rate pressure, in 1999 and in 2000. In the first episode, there was a 
sharp increase in interest rates, in the context of a monetary framework with both an inflation 
objective and an explicit exchange rate objective (in fact a band). Subsequently, in 
September 2000, the authorities abandoned the band for a freer floating, and the sharp 
depreciation in 2000 was not accompanied by any interest rate increase. As with the other 
countries, there is no large jump in inflation associated with this depreciation, while the 
economy recovered from the recession. One can perhaps infer from this experience either 
that Chile accrued credibility in 1999, which it subsequently used, or that it learned not to 
fear floating. 
 
The comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore (Figures 3c and 3f) suggests a parallel with 
that of Mexico and Argentina. In Hong Kong, in the adjustment, at least initially, was in the 
form of higher interest rates and a big output drop, while in Singapore we observe a sharp 
nominal and, eventually, real effective depreciation, with a moderate monetary tightening 
and no recession. Three differences with Mexico/Argentina are worth noting. First, 
Singapore allowed only a brief and fairly modest interest rate response. Second, one cannot 
                                                   
10 On Mexico’s experience during this period, see Carstens and Werner (1999). It is striking 
to note the strong trend appreciation in the real exchange rate through the period under 
examination. It might be noted that this follows the sharp real depreciation of 1995. Of 
course Mexico benefited from the strong growth in the United States during this period, but 
the deviation in the real exchange rate from the trend appreciation is perhaps all the more 
remarkable.   
 
attribute its strong growth performance to its location. And third, the small size and 
flexibility of the Hong Kong economy emerge in the large, though lagged, disinflation (at a 
five percent annual rate) that did ultimately lead to a substantial real exchange rate 
adjustment. 
  
This anecdotal evidence is suggestive of several tentative observations. (i) The floating 
exchange rate countries do in fact allow exchange rates to move in response to shocks, 
though interest rate responses are also sharp sometimes. (ii) There is some suggestion that 
exchange rate flexibility may have been helpful for output. (iii) Peru’s high degree of 
dollarization did not preclude some exchange rate response. (iv) At least for Mexico, real 
interest rates seem to have declined recently in response to the recession. (v) There is no 
clear sign that pass-through has been extremely high following the exchange rate adjustments 
in these floating exchange rate countries. (vi) Hong Kong’s size and flexibility clearly make 
it a more plausible candidate for fixing than Argentina, and this shows up in the much more 
rapid response of prices to the need for a real depreciation. (vii). There is some evidence for 
gradual improvement in the effectiveness of floating regimes, at least in the case of Chile. 
 
This perusal of cases can hardly be definitive, and others will no doubt look at these episodes 
differently.
11 We now turn to more systematic evidence regarding the effectiveness of 
floating exchange rates in emerging markets. 
 
 
A Benchmark for Monetary Policy  
 
Much of the discussion of design of optimal policy, especially for advanced economies, has 
focused on Taylor rules in recent years, following Taylor (1993). In this framework, 
monetary policy follows a rule of the form:  
 










t i is the target rate for the monetary policy instrument (for example an overnight 
interest rate),  k t, p is inflation between periods t and t + k, 
* p is the desired inflation rate, 
q t x , is the output gap between t and t + q (that is, the gap between desired and actual output). 
E is the expectations operation, with  t W  the information available to policy-makers as of 
time t. 
* p is then the desired rate for the monetary policy instrument that would prevail when 
both inflation and output are at desired levels.
12  
                                                   
11 Viz Hausmann et al. (1999), for example. 
12 This discussion follows quite closely Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000).  
 
 
This formulation is quite general: it says that the policy maker tries to move the monetary 
policy instrument so as to achieve some success at both keeping inflation on track and at 
reducing the output gap. Note that the instrument usually is the interest rate, but it could be a 
monetary aggregate as well.
13 The values of the coefficients â and ã are useful summaries of 
policy. On the standard view that higher real interest rates contract both output and inflation, 
a coefficient of â above 1 suggests that policy will be stabilizing for inflation. Similarly, a 
coefficient of ã above 0 would be stabilizing for output. Strict inflation targeting would be a 
restricted form of equation (1), in which the weight on the output gap is zero. (The output 
gap would still be in W , so it would still matter for policy, a point to which we return below.) 
 
A policy of the general Taylor-rule sort can be derived for a central banker in a closed 
economy who has a quadratic loss function in deviations in inflation and output from their 
targets, in an economy with nominal price rigidities. More generally, the Taylor rule 
benchmark is buttressed by the observation that the rule has provided a reasonably accurate 
way of describing how advanced economy central banks behave, notably those of the United 
States, Germany and Japan.  
 
This theoretical literature was developed with reference to closed economies. It seems, 
however, that much of the closed economy story remains in open economies with floating 
exchange rates. The most obvious complication is the effect of the exchange rate, which 
provides additional channels for monetary policy to operate. The main effect is that interest 
rate contractions now affect inflation more rapidly through the exchange rate appreciation 
they induce, while their contractionary effect on output is also enhanced by the appreciation. 
Thus, smaller changes in the interest rate are appropriate for a given deviation from 
equilibrium values of output and inflation.
14 Note also that a standard Taylor rule formulation 
would include the exchange rate only to the extent that, as part of W, it helps predict 
inflation or output gaps. Thus, strict exchange rate targeting is inconsistent with this rule. 
 
The Taylor Rule in the Tropics 
 
We consider three characteristics of (many) emerging markets that may make a Taylor rule 
impractical: a lack of policy credibility, high inflation pass-through, and financial fragility 
with respect to exchange rate movements. If  lack of credibility of the central bank leads 
markets to interpret any loosening as a permanent shift towards higher inflation, there is no 
                                                   
13 Taylor (2000) notes that especially for emerging markets, a monetary instrument may 
make more sense, essentially when uncertainty about velocity of money is less than 
uncertainty about measuring the real interest rate or if there are large real shocks, such as to 
export demand. 
14 Eichengreen (2002) shows this in a very simple model. Svensson (2000) reaches broadly 
similar conclusions based on simulations of a much more elaborate framework.  
 
benefit to discretion. High inflation pass-through implies that exchange rate devaluations will 
end up being predominantly inflationary, rather than expansionary. Note that high pass-
though may well be a function of lack of credibility, as wage and price setters interpret 
movements in the exchange rate as signaling a loosening of monetary policy, rather than a 
change in relative prices. Finally, exchange rate movements might have drastic real effects 
through their implications for the balance sheets of banks and firms, as well as the 
government.  
 
Poor credibility and high pass-through coefficients imply would make the central bank less 
willing to disregard exchange rate fluctuations when using monetary policy for domestic 
objectives. The implication of balance sheet effects for optimal monetary policy is more 
complicated. The most obvious implication is that devaluations are less strongly 
expansionary, as the negative balance sheet effects on output counteract the stimulative effect 
on net exports. Only if balance sheet effects are so strong that devaluations are contractionary 
the appropriate policy is to raise interest rates sufficiently to prevent movements of the 
exchange rate, and in this case the (implausible) implication is that exchange rate 
overvaluation is good for output.
15  
 
Do floating exchange rate emerging markets follow effectively a form of Taylor rule? For 
comparison, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997) present baseline estimates suggesting that the 
G3 central banks have since the 1980s raised (expected) real interest rates when inflation was 
high and lowered them when output was below equilibrium (Table 9 lines 1 through 4).
16 
Table 9 also shows some roughly comparable results from the literature for Chile and Peru, 
from Corbo (2000) and Morón and Castro (2000). 
  
The evidence is not conclusive but is consistent with the view that these emerging markets 
did make effective use of monetary policy. Most notably, the coefficient $ is roughly 
comparable across the three advanced and two emerging market economies, though not 
significantly different from 1 in the case of the emerging markets. Thus, there is some weak 
evidence that these two countries can manipulate their real interest rate (in the case of Chile) 
and money supply (in the case of Peru) in response to expected inflation. It is important to 
emphasize that even if the coefficient on the output gap (ã in equation (1)) is zero, a regime 
in which the authorities respond only to inflation is still more countercyclical than a hard peg 
or dollarization, where uncovered interest parity suggests that the real interest rate increases 
when inflation is low. A non-zero value for ã is evidence that in addition to responding to the 
output gap through its effects on price pressures, the authorities respond to it directly.
17 In 
                                                   
15 Eichengreen (2002) and Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2001).   
16 The Fed seems to have given more emphasis to output after the initial disinflation period of 
1979 through 1982 (line 4). 
17 It might be interesting to examine the first-stage regressions that underlie these results. In 
other words, it might be interesting to see to what extent shocks such as foreign interest rates, 
(continued)  
 
addition, there is evidence of multiple objectives, in that for Chile a specification that 
includes the current account deficit (another announced objective of the central bank) works 
better, while in Peru deviations in the real exchange rate from trend are resisted by the 
authorities.  
 
These results are inevitably tentative. Compared to the developed country examples, the time 
series are short and the monetary policy regimes are changing during the sample, as we noted 
in the section above specifically for Chile. For Peru, Morón and Castro (2000) argue that 
during the turmoil of 1998/1999 the authorities were especially conscious to avoid 
depreciation, and they show econometrically that the revealed aversion of the authorities to 
exchange rate weakness was especially strong during that period. Nonetheless, their results 
also show some countercyclical response.
 In addition, it is often more difficult to identify the 
instrument of monetary policy in emerging markets, most notably where the authorities 






A complementary approach to looking at general monetary policy reaction functions is to ask 
whether emerging market floaters respond appropriately to specific shocks. We consider first 
shocks to the terms of trade. These “experiments” are especially useful since the terms of 
trade are particularly likely to be exogenous to monetary policy and because theoretical 
predictions of appropriate policy response are also fairly clear. A negative shock to the terms 
of trade shocks should depreciate the exchange rate.
 19 It might be appropriate for monetary 
                                                                                                                                                              
the terms of trade, or the exchange rate itself feed in to expected output and inflation and 
hence into monetary policy responses. (It would seem that Corbo (2000) did not include such 
variables in his first-state regressions.) 
18 Edwards and Savastano (1998) attempt to estimate a monetary policy reaction function for 
Mexico during the 1996 – 1997 period, though using somewhat different techniques. 
Hausmann et al. (1999), in a somewhat similar exercise, regress real interest rates on the 
output gap, and find that the correlation is negative, implying higher real rates during 
recessions. They note, though, that these results for emerging markets are similar to the U.S. 
(at least during low inflation periods). We know, though, from various Taylor-type 
regressions for the U.S. that monetary policy seems countercyclical. The difference may lie 
in the fact that one way to think about the Hausmann et al. (1999) regressions is that they are 
like Taylor-rule regressions that omit the inflation rate and are backward looking, in that only 
current or lagged output matters, not expected future output. 
19 Chen and Rogoff (2001) point out that it is a general feature of many plausible models that 
the nominal exchange rate should depreciate with negative terms of trade shocks. With sticky 
domestic prices, for example, a permanent change increase in the terms of trade will call for 
an almost corresponding appreciation to keep the relative price of domestic goods in line. In 
(continued)  
 
authorities to “lean against the wind” by raising interest rates, since inflation will rise. The 
“fear of floating” should not be absolute, however; output will also be lower because of the 
negative shock, directly motivating lower interest rates through the second term in equation 
(1) and also implying countervailing downward pressure on inflation. To the extent that 
emerging markets central bank lack credibility, face high pass-through, or view devaluations 
as contractionary, a sharper interest rate response and very limited depreciations might be 
appropriate, as discussed above.  
 
There is some evidence that emerging market floating exchange rate countries do, in fact, 
usefully depreciate in response to negative terms of trade shocks. Broda (2000) looks at a 
sample of 73 developing countries since 1973 and examines whether the business cycle 
response of real GDP, the real exchange rate and inflation to terms of trade shocks differs 
systematically across exchange rate regimes. He finds that, in response to negative terms of 
trade shocks, fixed exchange rate regimes observe real exchange rate depreciations only after 
two years, while they suffer large and significant losses in terms of real GDP growth. 
Floating exchange rate countries, on the other hand, observe immediate large nominal and 
real depreciations, some inflation, and much smaller output losses. A final conclusion from 
Broda (2000) is that countries that are highly de facto dollarized according to Baliño et al. 
(1999) do not look different in this regard. That is, when the regressions are run only for a 
sample of highly dollarized economies, it remains the case that floating exchange rate 
countries respond to negative terms of trade shocks with much larger real depreciations and 
much smaller output losses, while the inflationary impact is minor.  
 
On the other hand, the broad-brush panel approach hides many country idiosyncrasies, and as 
many have noted, the available systematic exchange rate classifications are not entirely 
convincing. Moreover, the approach is short-run, in that the interest is on responses to shocks 
in a horizon of a few years. A complementary approach comes from considering how the 
nominal exchange rate responds to long-run trends that affect the equilibrium real exchange 
rate. One potential advantage of a floating, compared to a fixed exchange rate regime might 
be that it could allow the real exchange rate to trend, as necessary given underlying economic 
forces, without demanding changes in the price level, as would be the case with dollarization 
or a hard peg. Chen and Rogoff (2002) examine the long-run relationship between the real 
exchange rate and real commodity prices for three small open developed countries, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand. They find that world real commodity prices have a strong and 
fairly stable relationship with the real exchange rate of New Zealand and Australia, while the 
result is less clear for Canada. For example, a long depreciating trend in the Australian real 
exchange rate can be explained in terms of a similar downward trend in the real commodity 
prices of Australia’s main exports. In the absence of a floating exchange rate, Australia 
                                                                                                                                                              
the Dornbusch (1976) model, similarly, a permanent change in the terms of trade requires a 
full adjustment of the nominal exchange rate, in order to reproduce the flexible price 
equilibrium.    
would have had to have deflation (relative to its low-inflation trading partners) over two 
decades to achieve a similar adjustment.  
 
Does this sort of result hold for emerging markets as well? In more recent work, Cashin and 
Sahay (forthcoming) show that the real (and nominal) depreciation of the South African rand 
over the two decades since 1979 is explained by a continued decline in the real price of its 
commodity exports. Similarly, then, to Australia, South Africa would have had to suffer 
ongoing relative deflation, or progressively more relative overvaluation of the currency, in 
the absence of the ability to depreciate the exchange rate.  
 
These two sorts of evidence, taken together, provide a compelling set of examples of 
situations in which the ability to float the exchange rate can ease adjustment to real external 
shocks, both in the short run and over long horizons. It will be interesting to see if these 
results extend to other emerging markets. 
 
Foreign Interest Rate Shocks 
 
An increase in the foreign interest rate will, like a negative terms of trade shock, tend to 
depreciate the exchange rate and hence cause inflation. Thus, equation (1) implies some 
contractionary monetary policy response. Again, however, since the monetary policy 
response will itself reduce output, the monetary authority should “lean against the wind” but 
not fully offset the shock.
20 Unlike terms of trade shocks, however, permanent shocks should 
be more fully offset, as inflation will not tend to come down over time in the absence of a 
reduction in output. More generally, uncovered interest parity implies that a permanent 
increase in the foreign interest rate requires, in the long run, a corresponding increase in the 
domestic interest rate to maintain a stable inflation rate and output gap, independent of the 
exchange rate regime.
21 However, temporary shocks should be less than fully offset.  
 
Hausmann et al. (1999) find that the reaction of domestic rates to U.S. rates is insignificantly 
different across regimes using monthly data from 1960 to 1998 for 11 emerging markets. 
Moreover, using daily data for 1998-99 for Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina, they find that 
the reaction of domestic interest rates to the international risk premium is highest in Mexico, 
the country with the most flexible exchange rate regime. In a more comprehensive study, 
Frankel, Schmukler and Servén (2000) regress quarterly and monthly domestic interest rates 
in several emerging market countries on the U.S. Federal Funds rate, along with several 
                                                   
20 Eichengreen (2002) makes these points informally. Parrado and Velasco (2001) conclude 
that, in an optimizing model of a small open economy in the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) 
tradition, the interest rate should respond counter-cyclically to domestic demand shocks. 
Moreover a floating exchange rate is still optimal, though the interest rate should offset, but 
in general only partially, shocks to foreign interest rates. 
21 Eichengreen (2002) emphasizes these points.  
 
controls. They find mixed results: over the long sample floats seem to have some insulating 
properties, but not for developing countries in the 1990s alone. These sorts of studies suggest 
a mixed picture. Indeed, they are broadly consistent with our examination of a few cases 
above: interest rates do indeed go up response to shocks in floating exchange rate countries.  
 
Another perspective, though, is available from Borensztein, Zettelmeyer and Philippon 
(2001), who examine the response of domestic interest rates and exchange rates to shocks to 
the U.S. Fed Fund rate and the risk premium to emerging market debt in a small sample of 
polar extreme regimes (Hong Kong, Singapore, Mexico and Argentina). They attempt to 
identify the effects of surprises to the U.S. Fed Fund rate, rather than any movements in the 
rates that may reflect underlying factors affecting both emerging markets and the U.S. For 
example, unexpectedly high growth in the U.S. could drive up both U.S. and Mexican 
interest rates, without a direct causal connection. Moreover, they look at the short-run 
dynamic effects of changes in rates, rather than looking at how the levels of the two rates 
move together. Finally, they provide a benchmark by comparing their results to those for 
developed country floaters such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand.  
 
Their main results are that interest rates in Hong Kong seem to react one-for-one to U.S. 
monetary policy shocks, while interest rates in Singapore increase by about 0.3 basis points 
(bp) to a 1 bp increase in U.S. interest rates; there is a also a significant but moderate 
exchange rate depreciation. Singapore looks a lot like the developed countries Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand. The results for the comparison between Argentina and Mexico 
with respect to U.S. interest rate shocks are inconclusive. In particular, imprecise estimates 
for Mexico make it difficult to discern any statistically robust result. There is no evidence, 
though, that rates in Mexico go up more than in Argentina, unlike Hausmann et al. (1999), 
while clearly the Mexican exchange rate does depreciate in response to the U.S. shocks, 
consistent with the results in Frankel, Schmukler and Servén (2000).  
 
To sum up, the evidence on the ability of floating exchange rate regimes to buffer interest 
rate shocks is broadly inconclusive. Singapore seems to float like a developed country in this 
sense and looks very different from Hong Kong. The data do not seem to allow the drawing 
of a clear distinction between Mexico and Argentina. Mexico floats in the sense that the 
exchange rate does depreciate when the Fed surprises with an interest rate increase, but 




Experience in Mexico, Brazil, Russia, and other countries that have undergone extremely 
large devaluations, is that pass-through has been moderate. We saw in section A that casual 
observation suggested little pass-through in the countries we looked at there. Borensztein and 
De Gregorio (1999) and Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) find that where output is below 
potential, the real exchange rate is initially misaligned, and the initial rate of inflation is low, 
pass-through is also low. This suggests that, in less extreme conditions, pass-through may be 
low where countries have established a track record of credibility with respect to their 
monetary policy in the context of a floating exchange rate, since in this case devaluations will  
 
tend to happen when the exchange rate is overvalued in the first place, while initial inflation 
will be low. 
 
We present some evidence on this conjecture for Mexico. We have made a crude estimate of 
inflation pass-through by regressing (the log of) prices on past prices and current and past 
exchange rate levels in the context of a two-variable VAR in prices and the exchange rate. 
The figure shows how an innovation of one percent in the exchange rate passes through into 
changes in the price level over time. The upper curve has been estimated over the 1995 to 
1998 period, while the latter curve has been estimated over the 1999 through 2001 period. 
While these results are only suggestive, they do suggest that pass-through has become lower 
over time in Mexico since the introduction of floating during the crisis of 1995.
22 
 
Do emerging markets pay a large price in terms of credibility or volatility?  
 
We have observed a variety of pieces of evidence suggesting that emerging market floaters 
may be able to loosen monetary and exchange rate policy when domestic conditions are weak 
or external real shocks call for nominal exchange rate depreciation; they may even be able to 
buffer external interest rate shocks to some extent. We have not examined the price they may 
be paying for this flexibility.  
 
First, has there been a price in terms of higher inflation? The answer is generally negative. In 
recent years emerging market floating exchange rate countries have, in contrast to earlier 
periods such as the 1970s and 1980s, been able to control inflation.
23  
 
Second, have emerging market floaters suffered from chronically higher real interest rates as 
a result of the lack of credibility associated with a float? Hausmann et al. (1999) find that, 
even looking at lower inflation periods only, real interest rates were significantly higher in 
floating than in fixed exchange rate countries in the 1990s (9.2 percent versus 5.1 percent). In 
the much broader sample studied in Ghosh et al. (1997), pegged exchange rate regimes also 
have somewhat lower average real interest rates. However, they find no systematic difference 
in the average rate of growth across regimes. This evidence is suggestive of a credibility 
effect associated with floating exchange rate regimes. It would be interesting to explore if 
credibility increases as countries gain experience practicing floating exchange rate regimes. 
 
Finally, is exchange rate volatility excessive in emerging market floaters? Note that there is 
evidence for advanced economies that much of the exchange rate volatility is unrelated to 
fundamentals. For example, Flood and Rose (1995) find that the only economic variable 
                                                   
22 Carstens and Werner (1999) present other evidence to this effect. 
23 We do not discuss here the interesting question about effectiveness of strict inflation 
targeting versus other methods of managing a floating exchange rate. On this see Corbo et al. 
(2001), who focus more on emerging markets than most of the literature.   
whose behavior depends systematically on the exchange rate regime is the real exchange rate, 
which is much more volatile in floats. In other words, there is no sign that the volatility 
associated with floats achieves lower volatility in some other dimension (such as interest 
rates).
24 For emerging markets, the “fear of floating” argument suggests that exchange rate 
volatility would be less than in advanced economies. Indeed, interventions in the form of 
foreign reserve market purchases and sales, and active interest rate polices, are surely 
characteristics of emerging markets, perhaps in response to what would otherwise be high 
volatility. Along these lines, Edwards and Savastano (1998) show that the volatility observed 
in Mexico has not been out of line with that observed in developed country floats, after the 




We have reviewed the attractions of each “corner” of the exchange rate policy spectrum, the 
adoption of a common or foreign currency on the one hand, and a floating exchange rate 
regime on the other, and asked which looks better for the countries of Latin America. From 
the optimal currency area literature, a high degree of integration promises large gains from 
trade and few costs to foregoing monetary policy independence to countries that share a 
common currency. An independent common currency for Latin America does not seem to be 
especially desirable on the basis of these considerations. For them, the choice in the near 
term is between floating and dollarization.  
 
We have also seen that there is no obvious case to be made for dollarization on the basis of 
optimum currency area considerations. Nevertheless, dollarization may be appealing to those 
countries lacking credibility and where de facto dollarization has already reached high levels. 
Thus, the ideal candidate for dollarization would be a small economy (not likely to benefit 
from a floating exchange rate to begin with), with close trade and economic links with the 
United States (to benefit from the lower transaction costs), with a high degree of spontaneous 
dollarization and poor credibility for the monetary authority  (less seigniorage to be lost, and 
less likely to benefit from a float). The most likely candidates are many of the countries in 
Central America., which are small and have high trade shares with the United States, and in 
some cases also substantially de facto dollarized. For these countries the key will be to find 
out how big the benefits of dollarization may be in terms of higher integration with the 
United States, when firm conclusions can be drawn from the cases of Ecuador and El 
Salvador.  
 
                                                   
24 Jeanne and Rose (2000) suggest in a model how “noise traders” could explain this result. 
Flood and Rose (1999) instead focus on how volatility in the exchange rate can be self-
fulfilling in that it can generate high and volatile risk premia that, in turn, justify the 
exchange rate volatility. In this context, a credible peg could fix expectations around the 
stable equilibrium and reduce volatility in the exchange rate without increasing volatility 
elsewhere in the economy.  
Many countries in South America have more credibility issues but are economies that may 
benefit from exchange rate flexibility. Countries such as Brazil, Chile and Colombia seem 
relatively well suited to float. But is a float viable? Emerging market central banks do not 
conduct pure floats, in the sense that they in many cases intervene in the foreign exchange 
market and regularly conduct monetary policy while keeping a close eye on the foreign 
exchange market. What does this imply? Policy reaction functions, and the behavior of 
interest rates and exchange rates to shocks of various sorts, suggest that exchange rate 
fluctuations seem to play a stabilizing role.  There is strong evidence that shocks to the terms 
of trade lead to appropriate adjustments in the exchange rate and hence relative prices, 
adjustments that would be painful if they had to take place directly through changes in 
nominal prices instead. There is some (weaker) evidence that floating exchange rate 
countries can indeed lower interest rates in response to depressed domestic activity and to 
relatively low inflation.  
 
Some countries do not fit easily in either extreme. Mexico’s close trade relations with the 
United States may suggest a move to a currency union, or even dollarization, over time. 
However, the Canadian model of floating while tightly integrated to the United States seems 
a successful model. Argentina is both without the credibility that would make floating easy 
and the characteristics that suggest that dollarization would make sense. While floating is 
probably the most viable option, the road ahead looks difficult in either case. 
 
We have painted a fairly static picture. If performance under floating regimes can remain 
acceptable in terms of overall price stability, one can hope for a number of developments that 
will further enhance this effectiveness. Wage indexation and backward looking inflation 
expectations in general may disappear as the central bank gains in credibility.
25 Firms may 
change their financial structure to reduce their vulnerability to exchange rate fluctuations, 
minimizing the magnitude of balance sheet effects.
26 We saw some hint of such improved 
performance in our examination of the Chilean experience of 1998/2000 and some evidence 
in the case of Mexico. On the other extreme, increased trade liberalization and further 
integration with the United States, combined possibly with positive examples from recent 
dollarizers, may make dollarization an easier choice in the future as well. In both cases, the 
move towards the corners will continue. 
 
 
                                                   
25 Corbo et al. (2001) argue that this has been observed in Latin American inflation targeters 
in the 1990s. 
26 Eichengreen (2002) make the point that, even if the economy on the whole cannot reduce 
its exposure to foreign-currency-denominated debt, firms can rearrange it so as to minimize 
risks. Martinez and Werner (2001) find some evidence that the floating exchange rate in 
Mexico has reduced foreign currency mismatches in the borrowing of Mexican firms over 
the 1992 to 2000 period.  
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1985 1990 1995 2001
South America
Argentina Intermediate Float Hard Peg Hard Peg
Bolivia Float Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate
Brazil Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Float
Chile Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Float
Colombia Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Float
Ecuador Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Hard Peg
Paraguay Intermediate Float Float Float
Peru Intermediate Float Float Float
Uruguay Float Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate
Venezuela Intermediate Float Intermediate Intermediate
Central America
Costa Rica Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate
El Salvador Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Hard Peg
Guatemala Intermediate Float Float Float
Honduras Float Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate
Mexico Intermediate Intermediate Float Float
Nicaragua Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate
Panama Hard Peg Hard Peg Hard Peg Hard Peg
Source:
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Annual Reports, International Monetary Fund, 1985-2001. 
Notes:











The IMF classification is based on countries' self-reporting. Since 1998, the classification incorporates the IMF staff's views. The data prior to 2001 in this table has 
been corrected on the basis of the IMF staff's views. In early 2002, Argentina and Venezuela moved to floats. Hard pegs include currency unions and currency board 











Table 2. Integration in Global Financial Markets: Latin American Countries, 1980-1999. 
             
   Capital controls  De facto openness 3/  Trade Openness 
  
Emerging 
Market 1/  1990-1999 2/  1980-1989  1990-1999  1980-1989  1990-1999 
South American Countries             
Argentina  yes  1.0  4.0  11.6  7.8  9.5 
Bolivia  no  1.7  10.4  9.0  25.9  22.4 
Brazil  yes  4.0  4.4  6.4  9.1  9.0 
Chile  yes  3.3  13.6  15.6  25.9  29.7 
Colombia  yes  3.3  5.0  6.1  14.3  17.9 
Ecuador  yes  2.0  10.4  7.0  23.2  28.7 
Paraguay  no  1.0  5.4  3.8  23.2  46.6 
Peru  yes  0.3  5.4  6.4  11.8  15.0 
Uruguay  no  0.3  10.1  7.4  24.1  19.8 
Venezuela  yes  1.0  5.2  17.1  22.5  25.7 
Median    1.3  5.4  7.2  22.9  21.1 
Weighted average    1.8  5.2  9.2  12.0  13.4 
             
Central American Countries             
Costa Rica  no  0.3  8.6  6.4  35.9  41.4 
El Salvador  no  0.7  3.4  4.1  24.5  27.2 
Guatemala  no  1.0  4.4  5.1  18.9  21.6 
Honduras  no  2.3  5.7  6.4  29.3  43.6 
Mexico  yes  1.0  4.8  8.4  14.7  24.5 
Nicaragua  no  0.3  8.4  29.7  26.4  45.9 
Panama  no  0.0  203.2  49.6  34.9  38.1 
Median    0.7  5.7  6.4  26.4  38.1 
Weighted Average    1.0  8.0  8.8  16.1  25.4 
             
Asian Emerging Markets             
Median    1.8  4.3  7.6  24.0  30.5 
Weighted Average    2.5  3.5  6.9  17.7  24.4 
             
All Emerging Markets             
Median    2.0  5.4  8.2  27.1  31.9 
Weighted Average    2.2  4.5  8.4  19.9  24.1 
                    
Sources: International Financial Corporation; Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and International 
Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.  
1/ IFC definition 
2/The index of capital controls ranges from 0 to 4 and it is the sum of four dummy variables that take the value of one if 
the country has (a) multiple exchange rates, (b) current account restrictions, (c) capital account restrictions, (d) export 
proceeds surrender requirements, respectively.  
3/ Absolute value of inward and outward flows of financial assets and liabilities (the sum of the absolute values, if 
available, of IFS lines 78bdd, 78bed, 78fd, 78bgd, 78bhd, and 78bid), as a ratio of GDP.   
 
Euro Area  Japan  United States  Western Hemisphere 
South American countries 
Argentina  20.9  2.4  15.7  0.6 
Bolivia  15.8  2.1  16.4  0.0 
Brazil  25.9  4.9  23.5  0.5 
Chile  21.3  9.3  18.4  0.0 
Colombia  15.0  3.1  42.8  0.0 
Ecuador  13.6  4.8  34.9  0.2 
Paraguay  10.3  1.9  12.9  0.9 
Peru  21.0  4.9  28.8  0.1 
Uruguay  17.5  1.6  9.2  0.0 
Venezuela  8.3  1.4  46.1  6.4 
Median  16.6  2.7  20.9  0.2 
Weighted Average  21.5  4.0  24.8  1.0 
Central American countries 
Costa Rica  20.9  3.0  42.4  0.0 
El Salvador  10.8  1.5  48.8  0.6 
Guatemala  8.5  2.7  44.4  0.4 
Honduras  6.0  2.4  62.7  4.2 
Mexico  6.1  2.2  80.4  0.2 
Nicaragua  9.0  3.5  35.8  0.2 
Panama  11.2  4.8  35.5  9.6 
Median  9.0  2.7  44.4  0.4 
Weighted Average  6.7  2.3  76.7  0.4 
Source: 
Direction of Trade Statistics , International Monetary Fund. 
Trade Share with 
Table 3.  Latin American Countries: Trade Shares, 2000.  
 
 
Argentina  Brazil  Ecuador  Mexico  Panama  Peru  Venezuela  Bulgaria  Morocco  Nigeria  Philippines  Poland  Russia 
Argentina  1.00 
Brazil  0.40  1.00 
Ecuador  -0.23  -0.41  1.00 
Mexico  -0.46  -0.02  -0.26  1.00 
Panama  0.00  0.11  0.13  0.06  1.00 
Peru  -0.01  0.47  -0.30  0.06  0.64  1.00 
Venezuela  0.29  0.34  -0.14  0.21  0.35  0.37  1.00 
Bulgaria  -0.48  -0.06  -0.05  0.50  0.55  0.56  0.35  1.00 
Morocco  -0.06  0.20  -0.43  0.65  0.39  0.45  0.52  0.68  1.00 
Nigeria  0.07  0.22  0.42  -0.33  0.56  0.43  0.36  0.30  0.03  1.00 
Philippines  0.22  0.39  -0.22  -0.07  0.62  0.78  0.56  0.45  0.40  0.62  1.00 
Poland  -0.28  -0.08  0.33  0.35  0.51  0.16  0.29  0.53  0.40  0.54  0.38  1.00 
Russia  -0.52  -0.29  0.01  0.62  -0.35  -0.31  -0.08  0.08  0.12  -0.44  -0.52  0.09  1.00 
Argentina  Brazil  Ecuador  Mexico  Panama  Peru  Venezuela  Bulgaria  Korea  Morocco  Nigeria  Philippines  Poland  Russia 
Argentina  1.00 
Brazil  0.61  1.00 
Ecuador  -0.39  -0.28  1.00 
Mexico  0.38  0.57  -0.26  1.00 
Panama  0.73  0.30  0.01  0.23  1.00 
Peru  0.83  0.61  -0.37  0.25  0.78  1.00 
Venezuela  0.37  0.61  0.11  -0.05  0.35  0.51  1.00 
Bulgaria  0.69  0.37  -0.26  0.21  0.64  0.70  0.35  1.00 
Korea  0.63  0.53  -0.09  0.03  0.65  0.76  0.78  0.71  1.00 
Morocco  0.74  0.60  -0.52  0.53  0.52  0.75  0.31  0.79  0.60  1.00 
Nigeria  0.47  0.42  0.33  0.02  0.53  0.49  0.75  0.57  0.80  0.39  1.00 
Philippines  0.72  0.42  -0.07  -0.03  0.77  0.83  0.69  0.72  0.93  0.58  0.74  1.00 
Poland  0.49  0.32  0.35  0.01  0.59  0.44  0.55  0.59  0.75  0.36  0.87  0.70  1.00 




Spread residuals are the residuals that result from a linear regression of the country's EMBI plus index on the global EMBI plus index.  
A. Long Sample, 1/07/1998 to 11/28/2001. 
B. Short Sample, 1/06/1999 1/03/2001. 




Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Mexico  Venezuela  India  Korea  Philippines  South Africa  Thailand  Turkey 
Argentina  1.00 
Brazil  0.90  1.00 
Chile  0.57  0.63  1.00 
Mexico  -0.68  -0.58  -0.34  1.00 
Venezuela  0.79  0.61  0.58  -0.75  1.00 
India  -0.82  -0.73  -0.40  0.51  -0.68  1.00 
Korea  0.92  0.81  0.59  -0.63  0.79  -0.76  1.00 
Philippines  -0.08  -0.03  0.33  0.30  -0.18  0.33  -0.16  1.00 
South Africa  0.87  0.72  0.52  -0.48  0.75  -0.78  0.92  -0.07  1.00 
Thailand  0.83  0.76  0.34  -0.39  0.45  -0.67  0.85  -0.08  0.79  1.00 




Forward premiums are defined as the log of the ratio of the 12 month forward rate or the 12 month non-deliverable forward rate to the spot rate. 
Table 5. Correlation matrix of Forward premiums, 7/26/2000 to 2/06/2002.  
 
 
Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Mexico  Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela  Cyprus  Egypt  India  Indonesia  Israel  Korea  Malaysia  Pakistan 
Argentina  1.00 
Brazil  0.03  1.00 
Chile  0.21  0.17  1.00 
Colombia  0.14  0.19  0.65  1.00 
Mexico  -0.22  -0.30  -0.44  -0.24  1.00 
Peru  0.01  0.41  -0.10  -0.26  -0.30  1.00 
Uruguay  0.02  -0.15  -0.07  0.33  0.39  -0.35  1.00 
Venezuela  0.08  -0.21  0.26  0.14  -0.11  -0.13  -0.34  1.00 
Cyprus  0.17  -0.09  0.14  0.53  0.07  -0.15  0.58  -0.21  1.00 
Egypt  0.03  0.13  0.25  -0.04  -0.26  0.13  -0.68  0.68  -0.56  1.00 
India  -0.15  0.36  -0.28  -0.39  -0.20  0.64  -0.62  0.14  -0.49  0.43  1.00 
Indonesia  -0.11  0.12  -0.10  0.33  0.10  -0.08  0.54  -0.41  0.42  -0.44  -0.16  1.00 
Israel  -0.29  -0.08  -0.48  -0.28  0.15  0.43  -0.09  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  0.52  0.25  1.00 
Korea  -0.25  0.12  -0.35  0.10  0.08  -0.05  0.57  -0.53  0.33  -0.53  -0.10  0.74  0.26  1.00 
Malaysia  -0.01  0.10  0.14  0.57  -0.15  -0.22  0.49  -0.23  0.44  -0.32  -0.34  0.81  0.04  0.66  1.00 
Pakistan  -0.21  0.13  0.03  0.28  -0.23  0.08  0.18  -0.19  0.25  -0.30  0.08  0.47  0.24  0.41  0.53  1.00 
Philippines  -0.25  0.11  -0.11  0.15  -0.19  0.18  -0.07  0.05  -0.19  0.15  0.43  0.28  0.35  0.30  0.39  0.34 
South Africa  0.00  -0.25  -0.37  -0.22  0.38  0.11  0.31  -0.26  0.13  -0.34  0.10  0.42  0.44  0.39  0.15  0.31 
Sri Lanka  0.06  -0.10  -0.03  -0.15  -0.18  -0.12  -0.54  0.49  -0.36  0.63  0.24  -0.29  -0.01  -0.35  -0.16  -0.15 
Thailand  -0.14  -0.01  0.00  0.47  0.05  -0.25  0.62  -0.36  0.49  -0.49  -0.36  0.90  0.11  0.77  0.91  0.54 
Zimbabwe  0.03  0.37  0.12  0.02  -0.23  0.18  -0.16  -0.25  0.04  -0.16  0.05  -0.15  -0.15  0.03  -0.01  -0.04 
Source: 
International Monetary Fund.  
Note:  
For the methodology used to compute the probabilities, see Berg and Pattillo (1999) and Berg, Borensztein, Milesi-Ferretti, and Pattillo (2000).  
Table 6. Correlation matrix of the estimated probabilities of an exchange rate crisis according to the DCSD model, 12/1985 to 10/2001.   
Table 7. Latin America: Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation 
 
 
Country  ICBI 
1/  Rate of Inflation 
    1985–95  1996–2000  2001 
         
Argentina  18.5  193.6  -0.4  -1.5 
Peru  17.0  299.0  6.1  -0.1 
Chile  16.5  16.2  4.8  2.6 
Mexico  16.0  41.3  15.7  4.4 
Colombia  15.0  24.9  14.4  9.0 
Bolivia  13.5  24.6  4.8  0.9 
Honduras  13.0  14.4  14.7  8.8 
Costa Rica  12.5  18.0  11.3  10.6 
Uruguay  12.5  68.5  10.8  3.5 
Brazil  12.0  700.9  6.0  7.6 
Paraguay  10.5  22.6  8.2  8.4 
Venezuela  9.5  40.6  35.4  12.3 
Dominican Republic  7.0       
Guatemala  7.0  17.4  6.8  9.2 
         
1/ Index of Legal Central Bank Independence. Source: Jacome (2001). Maximum value 
(most independent) is 19.  
 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
South America 
Argentina  50.7  52.9  55.7  57.3  57.6  56.3  58.4  61.9  64.7 
Bolivia  92.6  92.2  92.2  92.1  92.8  92.5 
Chile  4.3  3.7  6.9  10.5  12.5 
Ecuador  7.0  8.7  11.8  17.8  24.8  32.0  46.4  39.9 
Paraguay  42.3  49.5  46.1  40.1  44.6  51.0  59.4  63.7 
Peru  72.0  74.7  77.1  78.2 
Uruguay  81.4  82.0  82.5  83.7  83.9  84.2 
Central America 
Costa Rica  41.8  38.3  40.9  41.6  43.2  44.5  45.7 
El Salvador  4.4  5.5  5.9  7.0  8.0  8.2 
Honduras  15.3  20.8  26.9  24.6  23.2 
Mexico  4.3  7.6  8.8  10.5  3.8  4.0  4.6  4.9 
Nicaragua  50.1  59.1  59.7  65.4  69.1  68.4  71.7  70.3  72.8 
Sources:   Staff Country Reports  and   Country Desk Data , International Monetary Fund. 
8.6 (92-95) 
Notes: Brazil and Guatemala are not listed because foreign currency deposits are not allowed. Colombia and Venezuela are not  
listed because they have negligible foreign currency deposits.  Panama is not listed because it is dollarized. 




Table 9. Taylor Equations for Various Countries
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    Â  ã  Coefficient on additional 
variables in eq. (1) (as 
noted) 
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 All these results derive from GMM (that is instrumented) regressions of the sort described by equation 
(1) in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses. The developed country results are from Clarida, Galí and 
Gertler (1997), Chile is Corbo (2000), while Peru is from Morón and Castro (2000). 
2/ Monthly data from 1979 through 1994. 
3/  Quarterly data from 1990:1 through 1999:4. The dependent variable in this regression is the real interest rate; 
for purposes of comparison we have added 1 to the reported coefficient of 0.236, to correspond to the dependent 
variable, which is the nominal interest rate in the other regressions. The standard error is not adjusted. Corbo 
(2000) emphasizes that 0.236 is not significantly different from 0.  
4/ Chile has a declared objective of maintaining a current account deficit below 4% of GDP. The observed sign 
implies that an increase in the deficit led to a counter-cyclical increase in the real interest rate. 
5/For Colombia, Corbo (2000) used the deviation of the unemployment rate from trend rather than the output 
gap; here we present the opposite sign from that in Corbo (2000),for comparability. It may be that a difference 
in units explains the difference in magnitudes. 
6/From Morón and Castro (2000), estimated with the change in base money as the dependent variable from Jan 
1992 to December 1999. The coefficients are not comparable because of the different dependent variable. The 
signs are as expected, in that low inflation, low output, and a depreciated exchange rate imply higher subsequent 
base money growth.  
 
































Source: Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Annual Reports, International Monetary Fund, 1990 and 2001. 
Notes:  The data refers to 12/31/1990 and 3/31/2001. The number of countries is in parentheses. For 1990, official classification has been corrected on the basis of IMF staff views. 
South American countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Central American countries include Costa Rica, El 
Salvador,   Guatemala,  Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama. There are 135 other countries in 1990 and 168 other countries in 2001. Hard pegs include currency unions and 
currency board arrangements. Intermediates include pegged horizontal bands, conventional fixed peg arrangements, crawling pegs and crawling bands. Floats include managed floats 
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Figure 2. Latin America: Private Deposits Abroad, 1983-2001. 


































Source: Bank of International Settlements database. 
Notes: Total outstanding liabilities of BIS-reporting banks vis-a-vis non-bank residents of Latin American countries. The right hand side labels represent 
































































































































































Both Real effective exchange rate (REER) and the exchange rate (ER)
are defined so an increase is an appreciation. 



























































































































































































































































































Figure 3d. Hong Kong
Source: IMF
























































































































































Both the real effective exchange rate (REER) and the nominal exchange rate (ER)
are defined such that an increase is an appreciation.























































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
































































Sven W. Arndt 
Lowe Institute of Political Economy, Claremont McKenna College 
 
 
This is a very interesting and useful paper. It provides a concise and comprehensive review of the 
major regime options, recaps and evaluates a variety of country experiences, and assesses the 
suitability of major monetary policy regimes for Latin American countries.  An important, though 
not surprising, conclusion is that Latin American countries, on average, do not appear to be 
particularly well-suited for any of the currently fashionable fixed rate regimes, including 
dollarization and currency union. 
  While this conclusion is eminently defensible, it should carry a warning label, reminding 
the observer that Latin America is a vast region whose many countries are stretched along a wide 
spectrum of characteristics.  It would be a mistake to think of them as clustered around some 
average of common characteristics.  To think of those countries as a ”common” group involves 
classification contagion, which would be no more justifiable here than in the ”guilty-by-
association” approach of which investors were accused during the Asian crises of the late 
nineties. 
  One of the regimes evaluated in this paper is currency unification.  The authors conclude 
quite rightly that Latin American countries do not appear, on average, to satisfy many of the 
standard criteria of the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA).  It is important to recall, 
however, that these criteria are relatively static concepts.  They were originally developed for and 
applied to industrialized countries with settled economic structures and well-established and 
transparent comparative advantage. Since there was little reason to expect significant structural 
changes among candidate countries, it made sense to assess the suitability of monetary union in 
terms of existing structures and institution. 
  It makes less sense to do so in Latin America (and other cases involving emerging 
markets), where comparative advantage is being created, economic structure is evolving, and 
institutions are in their infancy.  Hence, any monetary regime implemented today must be 
flexible enough to accommodate structural change.  Indeed, it may be important to ask whether 
and to what extent regime rigidities may prevent emerging economies from reaching their 
potential?     
 
  Assessment of monetary policy regimes must take account of the dynamics of the 
underlying process.  This raises important questions about the endogeneity of OCA and of self-
validating processes.  The authors are aware of this possibility, but do not make it an integral part 
of their analysis.  Under what circumstances would adoption of a common currency in violation 
of OCA criteria nevertheless lead two countries with asymmetries to converge structurally and 
thereby satisfy those criteria ex post?  Should currency unification always follow trade, 
investment and production integration, as it did in Europe, or are there situation in which the 
sequencing may be profitably reversed?   
  This question is of immediate relevance to North America, where implementation of 
NAFTA is giving a major boost to cross-border production sharing between the United States and 
Mexico.  Trading patterns have been changing significantly in recent years, with Mexico’s share 
of U.S. imports at the expense, especially, of Asian suppliers.  Mexico’s share has particularly 
strongly in passenger vehicles, textiles and apparel, and consumer electronics.   
  But this has been more than a shift in the origin of U.S. imports, for it has been 
accompanied by changes in the composition of trade and in the nature of manufacturing in North 
America. While goods entering the United States from Asia tend to be largely ”made in Asia,” 
substitute products entering from Mexico contain significant amounts of U.S.-made parts and 
components.  When Mexico displaces an Asian supplier in a manner that leaves total imports 
unchanged, U.S. exports of components rise and the value-added trade balance of the United 
States improves.    
  As cross-border production sharing rises in an industry, the domestic and foreign 
branches are more fully linked and hence more prone to similar shocks.  It is a process that brings 
convergence between two economies which were, and still are, very different or asymmetric in 
terms of economic structure.  It is an example of endogenous economic integration. 
  Policy discipline and credibility are key ingredients without which no regime can survive.  
The spread of pessimism about the future of Latin American policies is not independent of 
pessimism about countries’ ability to impose discipline on the policy-making process.  The 
prospects in this area often depend on implementation of policy reforms and here the question 
arises of whether policy reforms should precede or coincide with implementation of an exchange-
rate regime or be allowed to follow?   
  The experience of EMU suggests the former, but it also suggests that a country acting in 
concert with like-minded others may find it easier to sustain policy discipline than when it acts  
 
unilaterally.  It may not make sense, as the authors suggest, for Latin American countries to 
establish currency unions today, with or without the United States, but it may make sense for 
them to establish reform and institution-building agreements designed to create the conditions for 
eventual monetary integration.  While individual Latin American countries have little clout in 
world financial markets, the group acting together can hope to establish a regional financial 
system that serves their collective needs better than present arrangements.  Over time, such an 
arrangement may even ameliorate the problem of ”original sin.” 
  Recent exchange-rate and financial crises have underscored the important role of foreign 
borrowing and foreign indebtedness.  The authors are well aware of the problem.  The trick is to 
find ways of disciplining foreign asset and liability management in both public and private 
sectors.  Practices such as those in Argentina will bring down any regime.  A major objective of 
structural and institutional reforms must be to strengthen financial markets, within countries, 
certainly, but within the region as well. 
  This was a stimulating paper, indeed, and I enjoyed reading it.           
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